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Russia on the protests in Belarus
The developments in Belarus have surprised ob-
servers, including in the Kremlin. Russia seems to 
have assumed an undisputed victory for Lukashen-
ka and the rapid suppression of post-election pro-
tests and had been preparing to increase pressure 
on Minsk and force it to make further concessions. 
One sign of this was the laconic congratulatory 
cable sent by Vladimir Putin the day after the 
elections, which emphasised the need to further 
deepen the integration of both countries.
When the protests started, Moscow seemed 
to be counting on Lukashenka to suppress the 
then-limited protest actions, which would have 
triggered Western sanctions against Belarus and 
deepened its dependence on Russia. In view of 
the massive scale of the protests, the wave of 
strikes and Lukashenka’s increasingly tense ap-
peals for support from Russia, the Kremlin has 
shown clear restraint. In a telephone conversation 
with Lukashenka on 16 August, Putin admitted 
that assistance from Russia could be provided 
to Belarus on the basis of the legislation of the 
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Due to the dynamic and surprising development of events in Belarus, Russia’s previous tactic –weak-
ening Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s position in order to force further integration with Russia – has had to 
change. Moscow’s restrained public reaction to the result of the Belarusian elections and Lukashenka’s 
appeals for help may suggest that in the face of mass protests, the wave of strikes and the initial 
signs that the ruling elite in Belarus is starting to break up, the Kremlin is considering the various 
scenarios in the neighbouring republic, including Lukashenka’s possible resignation. Moscow’s sup-
port is of key importance for the Belarusian regime, but Russia’s readiness to grant that support to 
Lukashenka – a difficult partner who now faces the threat of losing power – although considerable, 
does not seem unconditional. The scope and form of any such support will be the subject of the 
Kremlin’s calculations; these will be based both on how events in Belarus develop further, and on 
assessing the potential gains and losses for Moscow in the context of its relations with Minsk, the 
internal situation in Russia itself, and the attitude of the West. In the short term, Moscow is likely to 
try, both overtly and covertly, to prevent the uncontrolled collapse of the Belarusian regime, while 
sounding out possible replacements for Lukashenka and the political consequences thereof. Russia’s 
priority remains obtaining guarantees that the integration of both countries will be further deepened 
and Russia’s long-term interests respected.
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Union State and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (a two-sentence communiqué to 
that effect was published after the conversation). 
Nevertheless, his declarations were somewhat 
watered down by the reservations expressed by 
high representatives of the CSTO itself, as well as 
key Russian institutions (including the Federation 
Council) controlled by the Kremlin.
Neither has Lukashenka received any support from 
the propaganda machine in Russia. Russian state 
media reported cautiously on the results of the 
elections in Belarus, reporting that Lukashenka 
had been ‘declared the victor by the electoral 
committee’, rather than unambiguously proclaim-
ing his victory. President Putin’s eloquent silence 
in the days following the elections came in stark 
contrast to the narrative in the Kremlin media and 
pro-government opinion-makers; they have openly 
been speaking about a probable or even inevitable 
defeat for Lukashenka (these include a statement 
by Aleksei Pushkov, a senator and ex-head of the 
State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee).
At the same time, the Kremlin has been making 
clear its categorical objection to any Western in-
terference in Belarusian affairs. During telephone 
conversations with Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
President Emmanuel Macron and the President 
of the European Council, Charles Michel, Putin 
stressed that any external interference in Bela-
rusian affairs or pressure on the republic’s au-
thorities was unacceptable. The narrative from 
pro-Kremlin commentators and media has also 
been unequivocally anti-Western in tone. They 
depicted the developments in Belarus as a special 
operation of the West, and portrayed the protests 
as being led by provocateurs controlled from 
the West (including Poland), just as Belarusian 
state propaganda has been doing. However, the 
Russian media narrative clearly separated such 
‘provocateurs’ from the pro-Russian majority of 
the protesters in Belarus.
Belarus’s importance for Russia
The Republic of Belarus is strategically important 
for Russia on many levels, primarily due to its 
geostrategic location (which Moscow exploits for 
military purposes), and its political and cultural 
significance in Russia’s projects to integrate the 
post-Soviet area. Belarus is the most westerly 
country bordering with Russia; it is a buffer be-
tween Russia and those countries of Central Eu-
rope that are members of Euro-Atlantic structures, 
which Moscow perceives as anti-Russian.
In political terms, Moscow considers the Republic 
of Belarus to be part of its natural sphere of influ-
ence, which consists of those former republics of 
the USSR which are politically and economically 
tied to Russia. The Kremlin sees Belarus as a key 
element of the so-called ‘Russian world’, a civilisa-
tional space centred around Moscow. Belarus is an 
important member of the integration structures 
which Russia has established in the post-Soviet 
area: the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the 
CSTO (a military-political alliance intended to 
counterbalance NATO), the Eurasian Union (mod-
elled on the EU), and finally the Commonwealth 
of Independent States.
The degree to which Belarus is dependent on Rus-
sia is best illustrated by the military and economic 
dimensions of this cooperation. In the military 
sphere, Russia sees Belarus as a potential area to 
develop its own armed formations in the event 
of conflict with the West. The Belarusian army is 
closely integrated with the Russian army. Russia 
retains influence over the senior officer cadre 
of the Russian Armed Forces, and the formulas 
of cooperation developed over the years make 
it difficult for Minsk to use its own army in any 
independent way. The republic is fully dependent 
on military cooperation with and support from 
Russia: its own armed forces and arms industry 
cannot alone guarantee independence for Belarus.
In economic terms, Belarus has been subsidised 
by Russia for years through supplies of energy 
resources at preferential rates; these have met its 
internal needs, and after processing and exporting 
In view of the escalating protests, 
strikes and Lukashenka’s tense ap-
peals for support from Russia, the 
Kremlin has long shown clear restraint.
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they have also become a source of foreign cur-
rency. Russia is also an important market for many 
Belarusian goods. Moscow has been exploiting 
Minsk’s economic dependence to push for the 
integration of both countries, including trying 
to persuade Lukashenka to sign 31 so-called ‘in-
tegration roadmaps’. In the coming years, in the 
option most desirable for Moscow, this could lead 
to a significant increase (including institutionally) 
in Belarus’s dependence on Russia, which would 
limit its sovereignty to a symbolic minimum.
Russia’s current plans for Belarus
In the face of the present destabilisation, Moscow’s 
immediate goals are to prevent the uncontrolled 
collapse of the Belarusian regime and obtain guar-
antees that Russian interests will be respected in 
the event that Lukashenka is removed. It can be 
presumed that Russia is currently making unofficial 
efforts to secure its interests These may include 
negotiations with Lukashenka, either about condi-
tions for granting him support or for his resigna-
tion, and pushing the most favourable candidate 
for Moscow in any possible re-runs of the election.
However, the Russian tactic will be determined 
by Russia’s long-term interests towards Belarus, 
and these remain unchanged. The key goal is to 
keep Belarus within the Russian orbit of influence, 
since it is now – after Russian-Ukrainian conflict – 
the core of the so-called ‘Russian world’. Moscow 
wants Minsk as a partner which is not only loyal, 
but so dependent on Russia that any prospects for 
its geopolitical emancipation or closer relations 
with the West remain purely theoretical. To this 
end, it will push for deeper integration with Minsk 
on the economic, political and military levels.
It is of fundamental importance for Russia to 
maintain close military integration with Belarus, 
as well as to keep the present formula for coop-
eration with its armed forces. Its key interests 
include ensuring that the command of the Rus-
sian Western Military District retains its influence 
over the use of the Belarusian army; preserving 
Moscow’s influence over the senior officer cadre 
of the Belarusian Armed Forces; and maintaining 
the strategic military facilities on Belarusian ter-
ritory (the anti-missile early-warning station in 
Hantsavichy and the Russian Marines’ submarine 
communication facility in Vileyka). Regarding the 
relations between the two states’ secret services, 
Russia’s primary aim is to maintain the coordina-
tion of their activities regarding the joint defence 
of Belarus’s border with EU countries; their intel-
ligence cooperation against NATO; and the fight 
against organised crime and terrorism.
It is also important for Moscow to maintain its 
hegemony over Belarus in the context of counter-
acting the democratic transformation of regimes 
in the post-Soviet area. Russia, as an authoritarian 
country which has been ruled uninterruptedly for 
20 years by the same leader, has an extremely 
negative attitude towards grassroots social revolts. 
Faced with a decline in his own popularity, Putin 
may fear that success for the street revolution in 
Belarus – which has much in common culturally 
with Russian – could encourage his own people 
to undertake anti-government activity as well.
Intervention or hybrid diplomacy?
Even though the mood of the Belarusians protest-
ing against Lukashenka is not anti-Russian, which 
invalidates any comparisons with the ‘revolution 
of dignity’ in Ukraine, Russia would prefer the 
status quo to a victory for the revolution. This is 
due not only to the internal calculations indicated 
above (Putin’s fear that it will set a bad example 
for the Russian people), but also to the belief that 
the empowerment of Belarusian society and the 
democratisation of Belarus would automatically be 
a pro-Western phenomenon. Russia would regard 
this process adverse, even if it does become the 
main player after the possible fall of Lukashenka.
For this reason, it cannot be ruled out that – if the 
regime in Belarus collapses, but a clear alternative 
Moscow’s immediate goal is to pre-
vent the uncontrolled collapse of 
the Belarusian regime and obtain 
guarantees that Russian interests 
will be respected.
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candidate acceptable to Russia fails to emerge – 
Moscow may decide to support Lukashenka by 
means of force. However, the question about the 
scale and degree to which Russia will get involved 
remains open. It is very likely that Lukashenka will 
receive some kind of ‘hybrid’ support – especially 
if he retains control over the power structures and 
nomenclature. Should the Belarusian authorities 
resume the brutal suppression of the social pro-
tests, Russia could provide its law enforcement 
bodies with material aid, or informally dispatch 
units of the Russian National Guard onto Bela-
rusian territory. Support may also come from 
the secret services: some reports indicate that 
consultations have been taking place at this level, 
including a visit by a delegation of Russian special 
services to Belarus.
The most radical variant – open military interven-
tion – cannot be entirely ruled out, although it 
would raise many doubts, and Moscow would 
prefer to avoid such a move. It is not clear under 
what banner such an operation could take place; 
one of the reasons that would make the use of 
the CSTO for this purpose hard is a possible objec-
tion from Kazakhstan, which had been seriously 
concerned with the previous Russian interven-
tions in Crimea and the Donbas. Moscow could 
even hypothetically decide to use force in Belarus 
on its own, entrusting such an operation to the 
command of the Regional Army Group of the 
Union State that it fully controls. However, such 
an intervention would very likely provoke an es-
calation of the West’s sanctions towards Russia. 
On the other hand, Russia’s ‘constructive’ stance 
on Belarus could be rewarded with an easing of 
sanctions, something Moscow has been seeking 
for some time. Another reason for Russia to opt 
for the diplomatic path could be its awareness that 
the West (whose key leaders have been reaching 
to Putin) considers Moscow the main player in 
Belarus, and will continue to respect its position.
Finally, military intervention would risk reawaken-
ing anti-Russian sentiments in Belarusian society 
(which currently holds a positive attitude towards 
Russia), as was the case in Ukraine after 2014. It is 
also highly doubtful whether such a move would 
be received positively by the Russian people them-
selves, who in recent years have expected their 
leadership to solve the country’s internal social 
and economic problems rather than get involved 
in costly military operations abroad, and who have 
to this end been manifesting visible (albeit local) 
protest activity. It seems that in today’s Russia, 
a military intervention under the slogans of ‘pro-
viding brotherly assistance to Belarus’ within the 
‘Russian world’ would have no chance of achieving 
the same propaganda success and boosting the 
government’s ratings as Crimea did. The protest 
in Belarus seems to be very popular in Russia; 
widespread access to Internet gives Russians ac-
cess to many independent reports from Belarus. 
Admiration for and solidarity with the peacefully 
protesting Belarusians have been expressed by 
many ordinary Russians, even those who stress 
that they have hitherto avoided politics.
Moscow’s fundamental goal is to 
maintain its hegemony over Belarus 
as a core element of the so-called 
Russian world.
